nized parts, and that it is more easy to conceive how a cube is composed of other cubes than how one polypus is composed of others; but if we attentively examine what is meant by simple and complex, we shall then find that in this, as in every thing else, the plan of nature is quite different from the very rough draught of it formed by our ideas.

Our senses, as is well known, do not furnish us with exact representations of external objects, insomuch that if we are desirous of estimating, judging, comparing, measuring, &c. we are obliged to have recourse to foreign assistance, to rules, principles, instruments, &c. All these helps are the works of human knowledge, and partake more or less of the abstraction of our ideas; this abstraction, therefore, is what is called the simple, and the difficulty of reducing them to this abstraction, the complex. Extent, for example, being a general and abstracted property from nature, is not very complex; nevertheless, to form a judgment of it, we have supposed extents without depth, without breadth, and even points without any extent at all. All these abstractions have been invented for the support of our judgment, and the few definitions made use of in geometry have