

flect, and as the brute is a being altogether material, which neither thinks nor reflects, nevertheless acts, and seems to determine, we cannot doubt but that the principle of the determination of motion is in the animals an effect altogether mechanical, and absolutely dependant upon its organization.

I conceive, therefore, that in the animal the action on objects on the senses produces another on the brain, which I consider as an interior and a general sense, which receives every impression that the exterior senses transmit to it. This internal sense is not only capable of being agitated by the action of the senses, but also of retaining for a length of time the agitations thus produced; and in the continuity of the agitation consists the impression, which is more or less deep in porportion as the agitation is more or less durable.

In the first place, then, the interior sense differs from the exterior senses, in the property which it has of receiving all impressions, while the exterior senses receive them merely as they relate to their conformation; the eye, for example, being no more affected by sound than the ear is by light. Secondly, the interior differs from the exterior senses, by the duration of the agitations produced by exterior causes;