

In the same manner, and upon the same principles, may we explain, however complicated they appear, all the actions of animals, without allowing them either thought or reflection; the internal sense being sufficient to produce all their movements. The nature of their sensations alone remains to be elucidated, which, from what we have asserted, must be widely different from ours. "Have animals, it may be said, no knowledge, no consciousness of their existence? Do you deprive them of sentiment? In pretending to explain their actions upon mechanical principles, do you not in fact render them mere machines, or insensible automatons?"

If I have been rightly understood, it must have appeared that, far from divesting animals of all powers, I allow them every thing, thought and reflection excepted. Feelings they have, in a degree superior to ourselves. A consciousness they also have of their present, though not of their past existence. They have sensations, but they have not the faculty of comparing them, or of producing ideas: ideas being nothing more than associations of sensations.

Each of these objects let us examine in particular. That animals have feelings, and in a de-