

tion of former sensations, but also the comparison which the mind has made of those sensations, or the ideas it has formed. If memory consisted merely in the renovation of past sensations, those sensations would be represented to our internal sense without leaving any determined impressions; they would present themselves without order or connection, as they do in a state of intoxication, or in dreams, when they are so incongruous, and so incoherent, that we immediately lose all recollection of them. Of such things only as have a relation to others, which preceded or followed them, do we retain a remembrance; and every solitary sensation, however powerful, passes away without leaving the smallest trace on the mind. Now it is the mind which establishes these relations of objects, by the comparison it makes between them, and connects our sensations by a continued thread of ideas. As memory consists, then, in a succession of ideas, so it necessarily supposes the power by which ideas are produced.

But, if possible, to leave no doubt on this important point, let us enquire into the nature of that remembrance left by our sensations when they are accompanied with ideas. Pain and pleasure are pure sensations, and the strongest