

of any, yet we but feebly recollect them, and with confusion. All we remember is, that we were pleased or hurt ; but this remembrance is not distinct ; we cannot represent to ourselves either the kind, the degree, or the duration of those sensations by which we had been so violently agitated ; and the less are we capable of representing those we had but seldom felt. A pain, for example, which we have experienced but once, which only lasted a few minutes, and differed from all former pains, would be soon forgotten ; we might recollect we felt great pain, yet, though we distinctly recollected the circumstances which accompanied it, and the period at which it happened, we should have but an imperfect remembrance of the pain itself.

Why is almost every thing forgotten that passed during our infancy ? Why have old men a more distinct remembrance of what happened in their prime of life than what occurred in their more advanced years ? Can there be a stronger proof that sensations alone are not sufficient to produce memory, and that it exists solely in the train of ideas which our minds derive from those sensations ? In infancy the sensations are as lively and rapid as in manhood, yet they leave few or no traces, because at this