order, if he lives in society, and is obliged to act as other men. As these sensations do not create in him ideas, as there is no correspondence between his mind and his body, and as he is incapable of reflection, so he is necessarily destitute of memory, and all knowledge of In nothing does such a man differ himself. from a brute, as to the exterior faculties, for though he has a soul, and possesses the principle of reason, yet as this principle remains in a state of inaction, and receives nothing from the corporeal organs, it can have no influence upon his actions which are like those of an animal, solely determined by its sensations, and by a sentiment of its existence and present wants. Thus the ideat and the brute are beings whose operations are in every respect the same, because the one has no soul, and the other makes not any use of it; they are both destitute of the power of reflection, and of course have neither understanding nor memory.

Should it still be said, "Do not the ideot and the brute often act as if they were determined by the knowledge of things past? Do they not distinguish persons with whom they have lived; places where they have resided; and perform many other actions, which neces-