rived, of the modes of their fabrication, of the manner in which they were put together, and of all the effects of their combined action. But it is not necessary to know all this to be certain of an intelligent contriver. The first observer drew this conclusion rightly from what he saw, though he comprehended little of these complicated movements. And after all, what relation does the most skilful mechanist bear to his own workmanship? He does not create one particle of matter—he does not supersede one law of nature: but using the matter created to his hands, and forming and combining it in subordination to the laws impressed on it, he produces a connected succession of material actions, and obtains a series of results—foreseen in his own mind and determined in his will before he commenced the building of his fabric.

Something like this we can trace in the developement of organic beings. They are formed of matter, which was created, and governed by its own laws, anterior to their existence: they are matured by a regulated succession of material actions: when perfected, they exhibit an exquisite combination of mechanical contrivances, and organs fitted to carry them into effect. To such a structure are superadded vital functions and appetencies, which (like the moving force of a complicated engine) put all its parts into motion, and compel them to obey the laws of their destination. The external forms of organic bodies we can study, their functions we can observe, their internal mechanism we can partly trace: but when we consider the vital powers connected with their origin and developement, we find ourselves among phenomena out of