

enforce (with a fainter light indeed, and under a more feeble sanction) as in accordance with the law of our nature, and therefore with the will of God : and afterwards he might have proved, that the rules of action, derived from these two sources, are not only in conformity with each other, but call our highest faculties into activity and return into our bosoms incomparably the greatest sum of earthly happiness. Thus might he have arrived at a perception of an attribute of God, in the only way in which it is permitted us, by the mere force of natural reason, to reach high points of knowledge—by ascending from particular to general truths, from phenomena to laws ; and thus might he have concluded, that as in the material world we see in all things the proofs of intelligence and power ; so also, that in the immaterial world we find proofs, not less strong, that man is under the moral government of an all-powerful, benevolent, and holy God. Following this train of thought he might, lastly, have enunciated a proposition (resembling in its words what stands in the front of his moral system, but far different in its meaning and incomparably more true), that whatever is right is also expedient for man.

Whatever be the faults of Paley's system, assuredly they spring not from fanaticism. After rejecting the moral sense, but on no such grounds as have been just imagined, he proceeds to prove (by reasoning I shall shortly examine) that actions are only to be estimated by their general tendency—that utility is the touchstone of right and wrong. Here we have a rule, simple in its enunciation, and flattering to human pride : for man no longer appears as the subject of a law, but presides with the