

his immaterial attributes, that he may be brought down to the grasp of human thought. Not only in the extent and power of his operations, but assuredly also in their very kind, he is infinitely above the reach of man's imagination. If revelation cannot, without a miracle, give to a blind man any knowledge of the sensations caused by the pulsation of light upon the eye; still less can it convey to the mind's eye any knowledge of God that is not limited by the conditions of our being. Surely we may, then, believe that in religious knowledge there is much that is imperfectly comprehended: and if in the natural world each step of discovery bring to light new and unexpected truths, we may well believe that a revelation (expounding our moral condition in relation to God, and giving us a glimpse of our future destinies) must also bring to light something that is above reason—something that is new and unlooked for.

Let me not, however, be misunderstood. If revelation teach knowledge above reason, it does not thereby destroy the fair inductions of reason, otherwise the God of nature would be in contradiction with himself—A demonstration is not the less true because it is confined to its own premises: and if we deny the value of natural truth because of the narrowness of our faculties; we might, by like reasoning, set religious knowledge at naught, because it is limited by the conditions of our intellectual nature. In one word, whether we argue from man's ignorance or knowledge, we have no right to rob him of his inborn capacities—of the power of ascending from phenomena to the contemplation of laws, and of deducing general truths—of discerning the marks of designing wisdom in the universe—and of