

principle directs and controls the capacities and affections of our moral nature, but compels us not to root them out.

5. Under the preceding heads, I have considered the principles laid down in the first book of Paley's Moral Philosophy. The fundamental propositions of his system are drawn out in the second book: but they have been examined in so much detail in the preceding discourse, that it is unnecessary to go over the same ground again. Some one may, however, ask, how the principle of utility can be rejected, if such a well-digested moral system can be built upon it. We may reply as follows, to such a question:

First. That in moral, as in physical philosophy, there has been no end to plausible hypotheses; and that the ingenuity of man has never wanted plausible arguments to support a system.

Secondly. That many parts of Paley's system relate to questions of (what may be called) legal ethics, having no other basis than the general good.

Thirdly. That it calls in the aid of Scripture rules—though these rules are not derived from principles in common with itself.

Fourthly. That God is a moral Governor of the world—Or in other words, that the rules of conduct derived from man's moral nature, and from the declarations of the word of God, have a general *tendency* to secure our worldly happiness. But we have no right, on this account, to invert the order of our moral reasoning—to put consequence in the

soner: fearlessly accepting the conclusions (no matter how startling) to which he was carried by deductive reasoning from the principles he accepted. For an instance of this kind I may refer the Reader to the new edition of his works. *Vol. VII. p. 480. London 1817.*