

of philosophy, which is a fit subject of *professorial* lectures.”*

In commenting on the above passages, I cannot refrain from remarking, that if the teacher of philosophy cannot command the respect of his pupils, he must be ill-qualified for his post. No one who is master of his favourite science will fail to inspire the minds of his more intellectual scholars with a love of what he teaches, and a regard and admiration for their instructor. “*Addicti jurare in verba magistri,*” they will be only too prone to prefer Plato to truth, and defend the professor’s theory, even when he himself has seen reason to modify it in accordance with new facts and reasonings.

When we inquire by what kind of training young men can best be prepared, before leaving the university, to enter upon the study or practice of their professions, whether as lawyers, physicians, clergymen, schoolmasters, tutors, or legislators, can we assent to the notion that, by confining instruction to pure mathematics, or the classical writers, more especially if the latter are not treated in a critical spirit, we shall accomplish this end? Do not these belong precisely to the class of subjects in which there is least danger of the student’s going wrong, even if he engages in them at home and alone? Should it not be one of our chief objects to prepare him to form sound opinions in matters connected with moral, political, or physical science? Here, indeed, he needs the aid of a trustworthy guide and director, who shall teach him to weigh evidence, point out to him the steps by which truth has been gradually attained in the inductive philosophy, the caution to be

* University Education, pp. 46—53.