

of the more profound class of readers on the fourth chapter in this department of the work, and which treats of a peculiar argument by Hume on the side of Atheism. The truth is that we do not conceive the infidelity of this philosopher to have been adequately met, by any of his opponents; whether as it respects the question of a God or the question of the truth of Christianity. In the management of both controversies, it has been thought necessary to conjure up a new principle for the purpose of refuting his especial sophistries; and thus to make two gratuitous, and we think very questionable additions, to the mental philosophy—in the shape of two distinct and original laws of the human understanding, which, anterior to the date of his speculations, never had been heard of; and probably never would, but for the service which they were imagined to render in the battles of the faith. We hold ourselves independent of both these auxiliaries; and it is our attempt to show on the premises of the author himself, or at least with the help of no other principles than the universal and uniform faith of men in the lessons of experience, now of his atheistical, and afterwards of his deistical argument—the one grounded on the alleged singularity of the world as an effect, the other grounded on the alleged incompetency of human testimony to accredit the truth of a miracle