

that, for the purpose of inferring design, it is not necessary that the end of the arrangement in question should be some certain and specific end. It is enough to substantiate the inference that the arrangement should be obviously conducive to some end—to any end. From what the end particularly is, we learn what the particular object was which the artist had in view—but for the purpose of warranting the general inference that there was an artist who had a something in view, it matters not what the end particularly is. It is enough that it be some end or other—and that, an end which the structure or working of the machine itself obviously announces. In the case of a watch the following are the counterpart terms of the sequence. The consequent is a mechanism adapted for the *measurement of time*. And its counterpart antecedent is an intelligent adaptation, putting forth his ability and skill on the production of a mechanism for the *measurement of time*. But though we should lop off, as it were, the measurement of time or this specific end from each of these terms; and substitute in its stead an end generally, or a whatever end, the inference of an intelligent adaptation would still hold good. The consequent then would be a mechanism adapted for a *whatever end* (and that an end to be learned from the examination of the mechanism itself); and its counterpart antecedent would be an intelligent adaptation for *that whatever end*. For either the more special or the more general inference, we equally arrive at an intelligent adaptation. When we in the consequent restrict our attention to what the end