

impression, that there is a distinct and native virtuousness, both in truth and in justice, apart from their subserviency to the good of men; and accordingly, in the ethical systems of all our most orthodox expounders, they are done separate homage to—as virtues standing forth in their own independent character, and having their own independent claims both on the reverence and observation of mankind. Now, akin with this attempt to generalize the whole of virtue into one single morality, is the attempt to generalize the character of God into one single moral perfection. Truth and justice have been exposed to the same treatment, in the one contemplation as in the other—that is, regarded more as derivatives from the higher characteristic of benevolence, than as distinct and primary characteristics themselves. The love of philosophic simplicity may have led to this in the abstract or moral question; but something more has operated in the theological question. It falls in with a still more urgent affection than the taste of man; it falls in with his hope and his sense of personal interest, that the truth and justice of the Divinity should be removed, as it were, to the background of his perspective. And accordingly, this inclination to soften, if not to suppress, the sterner perfections of righteousness and holiness, appears, not merely in the pleasing and poetic effusions of the sentimental, but also in the didactic expositions of the academic theism. It is thus that Paley, so full and effective and able in his demonstration of the natural, is yet so meagre in his demonstration of the moral attributes. It is,