

between it, and the sentiments of Augustine and others of the ancient fathers. It is impossible not to be reminded, too, of these verses in St. James—“Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God. Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Every good gift, and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights with whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning.” Sin is thus made to proceed, not from any positive quality imparted by the Creator—but from the defect which necessarily attaches to the creature, and which can only be supplied by the descent of good influences from above. At this rate, God is conceived to be no more the Author of sin, than the sun in the firmament is of the cold in ice. This cold, too, is but a mere thing of privation—implying, not the existence of any force in active opposition to caloric, not even the total absence of caloric, but only the deficient supply of it. So far from this coldness of the ice being due to the sun, it is to the sun it owes that it is not much colder—for from him it has derived all the caloric by which it is raised above the state of absolute zero; and from the same quarter alone can receive those further supplies by which its heart of stone may be taken out of it, and its present intractable nature be wholly done away. There is a precise analogy here with the view which we have just endeavoured to explain of moral evil in its relation to God.

12. At the conclusion of Leibnitz's Essay on the Goodness of God and the Liberty of Man, &c.,