

its impotency and its blindness. The unwarrantable metaphysics which have been called to the aid of this high demonstration, have tended to obscure the reasoning both for the existence and the character of God.

2. We have already attempted to appreciate a style of demonstration respecting the divine existence, of which we can at least say that it has no efficacy with ourselves. And accordingly our decided preference is for the *a posteriori* to the *a priori* argument. Now the same style of demonstration has been applied with equal confidence to the topic of the divine attributes. In the works of Dr. Clarke and others, they are expounded synthetically, though he admits of the intelligence of God, that it cannot be properly and strictly demonstrated *a priori*. For this attribute, he does make appeal to the existing order and constitution of things—and after having based as it were one property or perfection of the Godhead on the evidence of observation, we do feel that though he resumes the synthetic process, he walks henceforth on a firmer ground-work, because of the stronger and more tangible material that is now incorporated with the reasoning. For example, that it is the property of the highest intelligence not only to employ the fittest means, but to select the best and worthiest ends—or, that a Being possessed of all power, being elevated above rivalry and fear, is exempted from every temptation to malice or envy, and so is exposed to no adverse influence which might else have hurt the entireness of His character as a Being possessed of all goodness—