

may thus be made obvious. The adaptation of means to *an* end of itself demonstrates intelligence, and also power when the means are effectual. But to be satisfied that there is goodness in the adaptation, we must ascertain what the end particularly is, we must be presented with adaptation of means to *the* end. The proof both for intelligence and power may be as complete with one set of ends as with another set wholly opposite. There may be as thorough an impress of skill and energy on a machinery of torture, as on some bland and beneficent contrivance that operates a blessing throughout the sphere of its activity—on the structure, for example, of a serpent's envenomed tooth, as on the structure of those teeth which prepare the aliment for digestion, and subserve one of the most useful functions of the animal economy. It is thus that a wicked and malignant spirit could give decisive, but most terrible demonstration withal of his Natural Attributes—so that these on the one hand may be most strikingly and satisfactorily evinced, while the Moral Attributes on the other may be involved in the mystery of those contradictory appearances in nature, which the wisdom of man has so vainly endeavoured to unravel.

6. The adaptation of parts to *an* end might of itself demonstrate the intelligence and power of a creative mind—nor is it needed for this conclusion, that we should advert to what the end particularly is. This latter inquiry may lead to other conclusions. It may throw light on the moral attributes of the Creator. Adaptation for *an* end might indicate all the natural attributes—the power, the