

and the whole mechanism of whose moral judgments was the reverse of ours—insomuch that they gave obeisance not of their lower but of their higher faculties, nay of conscience the highest of all, to what in our estimation are the worst atrocities of human guilt. Let but the vices of our world be deified into virtues there—and what should be the inference in regard to the character of him who was the maker of such a world, and of such a world's family? From a law written in the heart so different from our own, should we not infer a lawgiver equally different from our own? Should our existing decalogue have proceeded from God, it bespeaks a Sovereign who is the enemy of all falsehood and rapacity and violence. But another decalogue, the reverse of this in all its enactments, would have bespoke a sovereign the enemy of all that we are taught at present to revere as good, the friend and patron of all that we are taught to abhor as evil. Now the argument is the same, whether the enactments be written on a tablet of jurisprudence or on the tablet of our moral nature. A law of conscience opposite to the actual law would have indicated an opposite moral character in Him who framed us—just as much as would the law of an authoritative code, proclaimed by revelation from Heaven, if opposite in all its commandments to the law of Sinai. In other words, had our species from the constitution given to them rendered their moral acknowledgments to vice, we should have inferred the author of such a constitution to have been a God of wickedness—a sound inference truly—but not