

the universe that the law of miracles should come in just at the right moment, would the event be any the less special than if we suppose he stood by at the moment, like a finite being, and by his power arrested or counteracted the laws of nature? And the same is true of the means by which a special providence is brought about. An eternal provision made for it shows merely the perfection of the divine plans and operations, but takes nothing from its speciality.

A question may arise in some minds whether such views do not make all events special, though such a statement be a solecism. For if God has arranged the agencies of his natural and moral government so that all events happen just as he intended, on what ground is it proper to say that one of them is more special than another? Do they not all meet some particular exigency? And what more can any of them do?

The fallacy of such an objection lies in the assumption that all events are equally the objects of God's intention. If it were proper to apply such a term to God, we might say that there is such a thing as an *incidental* providence — that is, an event which transpires as the necessary result of a certain arrangement, but which was not the specific object of such arrangement. Perhaps our meaning may be made obvious by reference to an illustration already employed.

We refer to the supposition of a vast hollow sphere, with balls flying through it in all directions, and of course often interfering with one another. Take a particular ball, and admit that God has so adjusted its direction and velocity that, in spite of collisions, it shall reach a given spot at a stated time. Suppose that thus to reach the point is the grand object God has in view in setting the ball in motion. Yet, on its way to that point, it might encounter a multitude of other