

nave yet been stated; and here is your hypothesis respecting the development of marine algæ into terrestrial plants. We hold that against that hypothesis the objections bear at least as directly as against any miracle whatever, — nay, that not only is it contrary to an invariable experience, but opposed also to all testimony. We regard it as a mere idle dream. Maillet dreamed it, — and Lamarck dreamed it, — and Oken dreamed it; but none of them did more than merely dream it: its existence rests on exactly the same basis of evidence as that of Whang the miller's "monstrous pot of gold and diamonds," of which he dreamed three nights in succession, but which he never succeeded in finding. If we are in error in our estimate, here is the argument, and here the hypothesis; give us, in support of the hypothesis, the amount of evidence, founded on a solid experience, which the argument demands.

But to leave the experience argument in exactly the state in which it was left by Hume and La Place, would be doing no real justice to our subject. It is in that state quite sufficient to establish the fact, that there can be no real escape from belief in *acts of creation* never witnessed by man, to *processes of development* never witnessed by man; seeing that a presumed *law* beyond the cognizance of experience must be as certainly rejected, on the principle of the argument, as a presumed *miracle* beyond that cognizance. It places the presumed *law* and the presumed *miracle* on exactly the same level. But there is a palpable flaw in the anti-miracle argument. It does not prove that miracles *may not have taken place*, but that miracles, whether they have taken place or no, are *not to be credited*, and this simply because they *are* miracles, *i. e.* violations of the established laws of nature. And if it be possible for events to take place which man, on certain principles, is imperatively required not to credit, these