of organisms, and the different attempts of naturalists at classification, but also all the general biological phenomena which have reference to it. The history of the development of organisms, both the embryonal and the palæontological, comparative anatomy, the general economy of nature, the geographical and topographical distribution of animals and plants—in short, almost all the general phenomena of organic nature are discussed in Agassiz's Essay on Classification, and are explained in a sense and from a point of view which is thoroughly opposed to that of Darwin. While Darwin's chief merit lies in the fact that he demonstrates *natural* causes for the coming into existence of animal and vegetable species, and thereby establishes the mechanical or monistic view of the universe as regards this most difficult branch of the history of creation, Agassiz, on the contrary, strives to exclude every mechanical hypothesis from the subject, and to put the *supernatural* interference of a personal Creator in the place of the natural forces of matter; consequently, to establish a thoroughly teleological or dualistic view of the universe. It will not be out of place if I examine a little more closely Agassiz's biological views, and especially his ideas of creation, because no other work of our opponents treats the important fundamental questions with equal minuteness, and because the utter untenableness of the dualistic conception of nature becomes very evident from the failure of this attempt.

The organic *species*, the various conceptions of which we have above designated as the real centre of dispute in the opposed views of creation, is looked upon by Agassiz, as by Cuvier and Linnæus, as a form unchangeable in all its essential characteristics. The species may indeed change