yet a theory of life—we have not even a theory of the essential nature of gravitation; discoveries are waiting to be made in this region, and it is absurd to suppose that we are already in possession of all the data. We can wait; but meanwhile we need not pretend that because we do not understand them, therefore life and will can accomplish nothing; we need not imagine that "life"—with its higher developments and still latent powers—is an impotent nonentity. The philosophic attitude, surely, is to observe and recognise its effects, both what it can and what it cannot achieve, and to realise that our present knowledge of it is extremely partial and incomplete.

Note on Free Will and Foreknowledge.

In the above chapter I must not be understood as pretending to settle the thorny question of a reconciliation between freedom of choice and predetermination or prevision. All I there contend for is that no mechanical or scientific determinism, subject to special conditions in a limited region,