

more in his 'Scientific Psychology' (1824), he emphasised experience as the main foundation of the doctrine of the soul, but he significantly added to this principal foundation also metaphysics and mathematics. The object of the metaphysical inquiry was to arrive at a clear and consistent notion of the essence of the soul. The mathematical treatment was introduced in analogy with the then current mechanical foundations which had been gained for the physical sciences. Impressed with the fact that the inner life consisted in a continual movement of ideas (called in German *Vorstellungen*<sup>1</sup>), which

<sup>1</sup> It is probably through Herbart's influence that the recent school of introspective psychology in England, of which Prof. James Ward may be considered the leader and Prof. Stout the best known representative, has abandoned the older term Ideas—used since the time of Locke—for the more appropriate term Presentations. It is evidently a translation of the German "Vorstellungen," and permits of introducing the distinction between the mental fact or process of presenting and that which is presented; corresponding to the double meaning of the word "Vorstellung" as a psychical phenomenon on the one side and its definite content on the other. To a foreigner the use of the term "Vorstellungen" in Herbart's psychology with its two aspects occasions as much difficulty, whilst it affords at the same time as much helpful insight, as the term "Anschauung" in the philosophy of Kant and some of his successors. The rendering of the latter term by intuition was much less successful than the rendering of the former by presentation. Both terms have this in common, that they suggest a double aspect. "A presentation may be considered in two points of

view, either as having intrinsically a certain qualitative content, or, mechanically, as a condition of change in the total mental system of which it forms a part. It is in the former way, not in the latter, that presentations are usually regarded by all who are not students of psychology. From this point of view, attention is fixed either on resemblance and difference and other relations constitutive of the presented content, or on its relation to objects which it is in some way supposed to represent. In either case there will appear to be an entire absence of anything that can be called agency in the presentations considered. Variations in our idea of a thing do not alter the thing itself, and resemblance and difference are not in any sense modes of interaction. Most persons find it difficult to grasp the conception of a psychological mechanism, because they habitually regard presentations purely as having a presented content. Nevertheless, the mechanical standpoint is a legitimate one, provided that its nature and limitations are duly recognised. Presentations act and react on each other in manifold ways. They exclude each other