

cussion of philosophical questions in every instance where, in the course of this History, we deal with other matters than those pertaining to psychology or to the soul. It will therefore be useful to state in as few and simple words as possible wherein this radical change of aspect consists. Perhaps it can be more readily understood in contrasting the treatment which psychological phenomena received in the idealistic schools with that which obtained in the English and French schools during the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century. The latter had collected a large amount of detailed knowledge of the various sides which the inner life presented, but the problem of the unity and essence of the soul had been either neglected or kept in the background as belonging to a different province, or it had been pronounced to be insoluble. The first of these three positions was that of Locke, the second that of the Scottish school, the third that of Hume. Kant was induced to take up the question in the course of the study of some of Hume's later writings, and the problem which he fixed on was the problem of the unity of thought.¹ He did not start

and the philosophy of religion ; this awkward circumstance throws its shadow on his terminology. The same word may in the beginning and the end of a discussion mean something very different, though a clear explanation is wanting" (p. 149). The change in the philosophical language of Germany, which Prof. Eucken brings out in this passage, and in his further references to post-Kantian terminology, becomes still more evident and is liable to create still greater confusion for those who approach the study of this philosophy from outside.

¹ Looked at from the position

at which psychology has arrived in the course of the nineteenth century, we now see that the difficulties which presented themselves to Locke and his followers may, to a large extent, be traced to the atomising habit of their mental analysis, and that this is very likely owing to the fact that they desired to imitate the processes of observation and reasoning which had been adopted in the natural sciences. This atomising tendency of thought, so successful, and yet, as we now know, so one-sided in its application to external nature, which readily submits to a disintegration into sep-