

36.  
Disappearance of  
psychology  
in the older  
sense.

The process of generalisation, of the sublimation of thought out of the concrete into the abstract regions, had, however, a very detrimental effect upon the study of all those questions which deal with the life and nature of the individual mind or soul. Psychology, in the older sense of the term, as an analysis of the human mind, *i.e.*, of the individual mind, had really disappeared. The data of consciousness were only discussed in a critical spirit and with the object of leading beyond an individualistic conception, of overstepping or transcending the limits of the self (or ego), and of conceiving such words as consciousness, mind, self, and idea in a more general and impersonal sense as denoting at once the unity and community of many minds, many selves, and many ideas. It was only by elevating the philosophical point of view above the consideration of the empirical world of many things, many minds, and many ideas into the sphere of the systematic unity of all and into a higher hierarchy of ideas that Fichte<sup>1</sup> found it possible

ledge and faith, variously represented in the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte, it had to overcome this disturbing dualism, the mere subjectivity of religion; finally, as against Spinozism, renovated in German philosophy by Schelling, the absolute or universal substance was not to be dogmatically placed at the entrance of the system as an empty conception, but it was to be understood in its development in nature, the individual mind, and the mind of mankind. It was to be a subject, *i.e.*, a spirit. "The mind which knows itself in its development as such is science. There is its reality and the realm which it creates out of its own elements" (Hegel's 'Werke,' vol.

ii. p. 15). In this and similar passages contained in the preface to the 'Phenomenology' lies, as Kuno Fischer (*loc. cit.*, p. 293) says, "the whole of Hegel's philosophy."

<sup>1</sup> That Fichte's philosophy, for which he invented the new term "Wissenschaftslehre," was something very different from the ordinary psychological treatment of mental phenomena, was emphatically stated by Fichte in the earlier expositions of his doctrine. Yet if we advance to the study of his later writings, through which he gained a popular as well as an academic reputation, we find that Fichte himself recognised more and more the necessity of leading up from the position of introspective psychology