

deals with the facts of consciousness, meaning by consciousness the individual self. To avoid falling back into a discussion of abstract consciousness, the object of consciousness is defined as that continuum of (sensory and motor) presentations which to every person constitutes his actual self, as known by him. By introducing this term in the place of the more familiar expressions such as soul, mind, consciousness, ideas, &c., the various tendencies of older psychologies to become metaphysical, abstract, or intellectualistic, are guarded against. Further, by speaking of feeling, knowing, and doing, instead of the intellect and the will, the older faculty-psychology is avoided; the conception of a continuum, instead of that of separate sensations and ideas, guards the psychologist against that atomistic conception of the mental life which was common to the association-psychology in England, and to the psychology of the school of Herbart abroad.¹ It is characteristic of Ward

we lose sight of the wood among the trees" (p. 366); and he there puts forward the view, afterwards elaborated by him, that in every concrete "state of mind" there is presentation of an object or complex of objects to a subject; this presentation entailing, on the part of the subject, both attention and change of feeling (*i.e.*, pleasure or pain). By "subject" in this connection, he proposes to "denote the simple fact that everything mental is referred to a self" (p. 368); but adds that "it must be allowed that the attempt to legitimate this conception as a constituent element of experience is as much beyond the range of psychology as the attempt to invalidate it even as a formal or regulative conception. If Hume is wrong on the one side,

Reid is equally at fault on the other" (p. 369).

¹ Although the metaphysical conception of the soul is discarded, there remains in Ward's fundamental psychological position the primary dualism of subject and object; the former as a central and uniting point of reference, the "I" of our language as the knowing, feeling, and willing subject which in and through this knowing, feeling, and willing is connected with and stands over against its sensory or motor-presentations or objects. Through this scheme the atomising tendency of the older faculty-psychology, which analysed the one subject into a variety of distinct powers or forces, is quite as much avoided as, on the other side, through the idea of the continuum