

interest of these thinkers lay more in replying to the question, What is the truly real?¹ than in solving the critical problems which Kant had put forward in his writings: they desired to solve the problem of reality rather than the problem of knowledge. Accordingly I propose to relegate the exposition of the more systematic views of these thinkers to other chapters, where we shall deal with the problem of reality and other related problems which again and again present themselves to the philosophical mind. At present we must look for the beginnings of the modern theory of knowledge in a different direction.

III.

49.
J. S. Mill's
logic.

In spite of the small interest that J. S. Mill's 'System of Logic' aroused in philosophical circles in Germany,² it is nevertheless true that what is now

¹ "With Schelling the speculative form has been re-established, and philosophy has become again something specific; the principle of philosophy, thought in itself, reasoned thought, has again received the true form of thought. Thus in Schelling's philosophy the content, truth, has again become the principal object, whereas in the Kantian philosophy interest attached mainly to this, that knowledge, understanding, subjective reasoning, were to be examined: it appeared plausible, first, to investigate the instrument, the process of reasoning. It is the story of the *σχολαστικός* who would not go into the water before he could swim. To examine the reasoning process means, to

reason about reasoning, but how we can reason without reasoning cannot be stated" (Hegel, 'Werke,' vol. xv. p. 657).

² It was owing to the influence of Liebig, who probably came across Mill's writings during his repeated visits to England in the 'Forties, that the 'System of Logic,' which appeared in 1843, was translated into German by J. Schiel (1849), and published by the firm of Vieweg in Brunswick, who for a considerable period brought out the principal scientific works in physics, chemistry, and the natural sciences. It does not appear to have had any influence on philosophical thought till much later, when the same subject—viz., the foundations and