

ridge, the revelations of which were brought together by Carlyle, with cognate elements which Coleridge and he discovered in German literature, produced in the mind of Mill the impression of an actual reality, and elicited from him, in spite of his cautious and unimpassioned habit of mind, some very remarkable admissions.

Next to Mill and to those writers named above, all of whom continued the tradition of the Baconian philosophy, the thinker in this country who at that time laboured most effectually at the problem of knowledge was Sir William Hamilton¹ of Edinburgh. His writ-

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Sir W.
Hamilton.

¹ In point of time it would perhaps be more correct to say that the theory of knowledge in this country was first distinctly put forward as a special investigation and the problem of knowledge solved in a definite form by Sir Wm. Hamilton in a series of brilliant articles communicated to the 'Edinburgh Review' from 1829 to 1839. But the fact that they appeared anonymously and were more critical than systematic, also that they created what may be called a new style in the philosophical literature of this country, prevented their due appreciation till much later, when Hamilton exerted a great personal influence on Scottish and English thought through his (posthumously published) Lectures on 'Logic' and 'Metaphysics' at the University of Edinburgh from 1836 to 1856. The late Prof. Veitch of Glasgow defines Hamilton's conception of the philosophical problem as follows: "Science is knowledge—a form of knowledge. Whence knowledge in this form? If we seek a cause of the fact of experience, we may, nay must, equally ask for a cause of our know-

ing the fact. Knowledge has its cause or source in what we call mind, and it is possible only under certain conditions. The primary problem of philosophy is thus to investigate the nature and necessary conditions of knowledge,—the conditions of its own possibility. What is knowledge? and what are the laws of knowledge? Such is Hamilton's conception of the problem of philosophy proper. Keeping this in view, we can see how the philosophy of Hamilton rises to its highest question—that of the nature of our knowledge of the absolutely first or of the unconditioned. The line of causality in finite things leads backwards and upwards to the problem of an ultimate or primary cause, and we have the points—is this a necessity of inference? is it an object of knowledge? in what sense is it an object of faith?" (Veitch, 'Hamilton' in "Blackwood's Philosophical Classics," 1882, p. 36, &c.)

As to Hamilton's philosophical antecedents Veitch says: "Even in his youth he had gone far beyond the range of reading in philosophy then usual in Scotland. He had