

ings, most of which appeared anonymously in the 'Edinburgh Review,' date somewhat further back than those of the Cambridge mathematicians, and formed in a certain sense an opposition to the arguments employed by what we may call the empirical school. At the same time Hamilton's philosophy worked quite as effectively in the direction of generating the agnostic attitude of the succeeding period. Hamilton was as much influenced by Reid's original refutation of Hume as he was by Kant's 'Critique.' He believed quite as strongly in the truthfulness of our sensuous experience as he did in the relativity of all that we may call knowledge. To this latter doctrine he gave the name of the Doctrine of the Conditioned, maintaining that all that deserves the name of knowledge cannot rid itself of its inherent conditional character. To possess knowledge meant, for him, to move in the region of the

studied the 'Organon' of Aristotle, and had acquired a mastery of it at an early age, rarely paralleled at the close of the long and laborious efforts of a lifetime. Even at Oxford he knew it better than all the tutors. He was familiar with the principal schoolmen. . . . Descartes and the Cartesian school had been matter of minute investigation; and from Descartes he gathered the ultimate principle in his theory of knowledge, viz., the subversion of doubt in the fact of consciousness. He had mastered German at a time when few people in the country knew anything about its literature or philosophy. He had given a quite competent attention to the 'Critique' and to the logical writings of Kant. He had traced the course of subsequent German speculation through Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, as his un-

published notanda especially show. The influence of Kant both upon the cast of his thought and his philosophical phraseology is marked enough. In point of positive doctrine, however, the two men in Germany he most nearly approached were Jacobi and G. E. Schultze. . . . When he made his first published contribution to philosophy, in the Essay on 'Cousin' in the 'Edinburgh Review' of October 1829, the first impression, even among people who professed some philosophical knowledge, was that of astonished bewilderment rather than admiration or even appreciation. The Essay on 'Cousin' dealt with a question regarding the reach and limits of human knowledge which was wholly new, in form at least, to British speculation" (ibid., p. 26).