tion between the exact and the biological (including the mental) sciences was removed. But, fortunately for the biological sciences, a second and equally important step was taken about the same time, by which one of the fundamental conceptions through which we fix our comprehension of the phenomena of living matter received likewise a clearer definition. The older terms of development and progress, denoting not merely change but change from the lower, simpler, and less interesting and valuable, to the higher, more complex, more interesting, and more valuable, received likewise a more definite expression by which the natural as well as the mental philosopher were enabled to connect facts which before seemed unconnected, and to give to their descriptions and classifications a deeper meaning; enabling them also to some extent to know beforehand in which direction to look for the discovery of new and significant facts and phenomena. This second step may be identified with Charles Darwin's work and the appearance in the year 1859 of the 'Origin of Species.'

57. Darwin and development.

The title of this epoch-making book was not without ambiguity; for, in the course of the diffusion and criticism of the ideas contained in it, it has become more and more evident that the process of natural selection could not explain the origin of living matter, but only the origin of separate species, the greater differentiation which is continually going on in all natural and mental processes. The genetic view of natural phenomena has become limited to a genealogical record, without being able to deal with first beginnings.