

of their gradual development identified with the leading representatives of the various mathematical, physical, and natural sciences.

If we now look at the whole of this change, in the midst of which we are living, from a different point of view, we are led back to the observation with which I opened the Introduction to this, the second, part of our historical survey. We may say that this change consists in finding and fixing new meanings to the existing words of our current language; occasionally also in coining new terms wherewith to fix certain ideas and meanings which are unconsciously striving after clearness and adequate expression. Prominent examples of this kind are afforded by the words force, cause, and development. It is a clarifying process. But every definition has not only the advantage of producing clearness and exactitude; it has also the disadvantage of narrowing the field of vision, of limiting the view, leaving out much that lies outside, but which, though less defined, is not necessarily less real and important. If the scientific definition of the word force tends in the direction of making the word superfluous in mechanical science, it does not therefore destroy the deeper meaning of force as the cause or origin of motion which we continually experience individually in our voluntary efforts. If the terms cause and effect are discarded for the more easily defined terms antecedent and subsequent in time, we do not hereby get rid of looking for the sufficient reason and ultimate ground of this sequence and for the final end and purpose. If we are told that the object of science is to describe phenomena as simply and as com-