

in the University of Oxford in the place of Mill, and—what is of prime importance—always in conjunction with the Logic of Aristotle.<sup>1</sup> This fusion of two dis-

troduced aspects gained by a study of Continental thought. The second undertook to elaborate the Hegelian programme on independent lines, a task distinctly formulated already by T. H. Green. For this purpose its representatives studied not so much the historical as the logical foundations of Hegel's system, closely scrutinising what Lotze had already done in that direction, moving frequently in opposition to him, but with him also away from genuine Hegelianism. The former school had taken no notice of Lotze's writings, but subsequently formulated its opposition to the drift of his ideas in the first critical attempt which was made in this country to estimate the value of his system as a whole. This was done by Henry Jones in his 'Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze' (1895). After criticising in the Preface what others have termed the "theologising" tendency of Lotze's thought, he says: "Lotze's investigation of thought has had other and more valuable consequences. It has led modern writers to investigate the nature of thought for themselves, with a result that, particularly in this country, there has been a remarkable development of logical theory on Lotze's own lines. I refer more especially to the logical works of Mr Bradley and Mr Bosanquet. . . . This development of Lotze's position seems to me to issue in its refutation; and there are indications that the main contribution of Lotze to philosophic thought, the only ultimate contribution, consists in deepening that Idealism which he sought to overthrow," (p. xii). The quarrel, then, of the genuine Hegelians

with Lotze is that "if his view of thought be true, . . . the power of that idealistic reconstruction of belief, which has so strongly influenced the modern mind, is entirely broken" (ibid., p. xi). We must be thankful for this clear and concise statement, as it is very helpful in trying to understand the aims of recent philosophical thought as conceived by opposite schools. It also leads us on to the metaphysical problem, of which I shall treat in the next chapter.

<sup>1</sup> The philosophical studies in the University of Oxford would merit a special historical treatment. The only approach to this, so far as I know, is to be found in an article by Prof. Mackenzie in the 'Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,' which in the year 1908 published a series of articles aiming to represent the state of philosophic thought in different countries. The articles are of value to such readers as have already a fair knowledge of the problems which now occupy philosophic thought; but they nearly all suffer through being overcrowded with names, and exhibit a prevalent tendency of such writings in the present day—the desire to do justice to everybody. They bear testimony to the general inconclusiveness of recent thought. I would suggest to those of my readers who, being outsiders like myself, wish to gain some idea of the position of one prominent side of philosophical thought represented in this country by the University of Oxford, to read the three articles on Logic contained in the three last editions of the 'Encyclopædia Britannica': the first, by the late Prof. R. Adamson, was