

ing. One of these terms was "the Thing in itself," another was "the Categorical Imperative." These two terms fix, as it were, Kant's position with regard to the two main problems of reality, his answers to the two questions, What is Real? and What is the truly Real?

To begin with the first, with "the Thing in itself." When Kant analysed our knowledge of things which we call real, he not only, with Locke, discarded as apparent and purely subjective the secondary qualities, dependent upon the nature of our senses, but he also discarded the primary qualities, the space which things occupy and the time during which events happen, as arising out of the form of our perceiving intellect. Depriving thus what seemed to be external realities, the phenomena of nature, both of their secondary and their primary qualities, treated as mere appearance, there remained over only an indefinable something by which real things were distinguished from purely subjective images. This something we can, according to Kant, only *conceive* by thought, we cannot *perceive* it. It was a Noumenon in distinction from the Phenomenon; the former he termed "the Thing in itself," or "Things in themselves," in opposition to the Thing or Things as they appear.<sup>1</sup> This is equivalent to saying that ex-

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The "Thing  
in itself."

<sup>1</sup> A concise and lucid history of the influence of the conception of the 'Thing in itself' and its cognate but not synonymous designations as the Noumenon, the transcendental object or the  $x$  of the Kantian philosophy, is to be found in Windelband's 'History of Philosophy' (§ 41) frequently referred

to already. Jacobi's pertinent remarks, made so early as 1787 ('Werke,' vol. ii. p. 304), "that *without* this assumption he was unable to enter the system, and *with* it unable to remain inside of it," indicates the difficulty of thinking of something of which we know nothing. Accordingly the Kantian