

translate the title of this book as the Phenomenology of Spirit, for by this word (in German *Geist*) the philosophy of Hegel is most clearly distinguished from that of Schelling. Both philosophies profess to be, as was that of Spinoza, philosophies of the Absolute. With Spinoza the Absolute was conceived as substance, with Schelling it meant at that time the identity or indifference of matter and mind, of the inner world and the outer, the hidden ground, source, or unity of both. From that point where he conceived the Absolute as the deeper lying unity or identity, Schelling went on in search of other fuller and more adequate expressions, at the moment when Hegel, after many years of preparatory work, conceived the essence of the Absolute to be Spirit.

Preface to Hegel's 'Phenomenology' in the year 1807. The last letter which he addressed to Hegel, six months after receiving the great work of the latter, is accompanied by a copy of his own celebrated Address before the Munich Academy which created such a sensation. The contrast between Schelling's and Hegel's minds, as well as that between their work, is indeed significantly expressed by these two characteristic products of the genius of each. On the one side, a ponderous volume, full of enigmas, which has ever since its appearance furnished material for philosophical thought and on which the last word has not yet been spoken. On the other side, a finished oration, one of Schelling's best productions, admired by many, full of artistic and poetical life and suggestion, comparable to some of Goethe's best writings in German or Ruskin's in English. And at the same time we have Schelling's own expression of the deep-lying difference which separated him after-

wards and increasingly from Hegel. "Our real difference of conviction or opinion—an irreconcilable difference — can be shortly and clearly found and decided: for indeed everything might be reconciled, one thing excepted. Thus, I must confess, that I can so far not understand your meaning when you oppose the notion [*Begriff*] to the intuition [*Anschaung*, *i.e.*, 'seeing']. You cannot possibly under the former term mean anything else but what you and I have called the Idea, the nature of which is to have one side from which it is 'notion' and one from which it is 'intuition'" (*Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 124). Expressed in terms which I have used several times already, we may say that Hegel represents the analytical method to be completed by a subsequent synthesis; Schelling on his part started from, and remained permanently in, the region of synopsis, of seeing things in their Together. (See *supra*, p. 192 note.)