

which I have been treating so far, the problem of the Soul, the problem of Knowledge, the problem of Reality, do not exist for Comte. He starts with a belief in the certainty and finality of exact or scientific knowledge, and finds the problem of philosophy merely in understanding and accepting the existing methods of this knowledge and in extending the use of them into those regions where they have not been successfully introduced, notably into the historical and social sciences. Thus we shall not expect to find in Comte's writings any valuable contributions to the solution of the central problem of philosophy, though we may find many useful beginnings and suggestions in the direction of the methodical or exact treatment of social or practical questions. When we come to deal with these we shall meet with many of Comte's suggestions and shall have to recognise the importance of his influence.

35.
Schelling's
positive
philosophy.

For the moment it is more interesting to understand what Schelling really meant by his continually repeated demand of a positive philosophy to supplement and complete the then current negative philosophy of the Hegelian school. Schelling had recognised that the purely logical development of thought, even if it were capable of reaching up to the highest reality or descending to the ultimate source and root of all existence, would end in a mere formalism, being at best able only to unfold the necessary stages in which any or every reality must be conceived by us to move and develop, without further affording an insight into the varied nature of all the real things which surround us in space and time, and which exhibit individual life and