

freedom. In opposition therefore to Hegel, who regarded the necessary forms of thought and the stages of the logical process as representing also the phases of existence, the life of the Logos, Schelling thought it incumbent upon philosophy to recognise in the existing world an element of freedom or, as it has since been frequently termed, the contingent in contradistinction to the necessary. His later philosophy, which existed however only as a postulate or an unfilled programme, was therefore significantly characterised by him as the philosophy of Freedom. In the actual existing world of things and phenomena he recognised something that might also, so far as we could understand, have been otherwise, and which, though following the necessary and eternal laws of all reality, was only one of the many ways in which the Absolute or ultimate ground of everything realised itself. To this idea Schelling in his later philosophy gave a distinctly religious colouring by conceiving the actual or contingent world as having come into existence by a falling away from the original identity in which it lived in the bosom of the Absolute or Divine Being. This religious turn in his speculation will occupy us on a subsequent occasion. Here it is only necessary to point out how Schelling, though unable to give a satisfactory solution, put his finger upon the difficulty which was inherent in Hegel's scheme, and which became more and more apparent as the manifold examples and applications of this scheme had to submit to rigorous tests and to meet the attacks of criticism.¹

86.
His religi-
ous turn.

¹ We may thus say that Schelling's mind, during the last forty years of his life, wrestled with the two great problems which have since been brought out more clearly and on which philosophical thought