

The middle of the century thus found the problem of Reality pushed into the foreground from many sides. A multitude of ideas was floating about in the philosophical atmosphere. They were largely remnants of the idealism which pervaded the earlier systems as well as the classical and romantic literature of the first third of the century; they were partly also new suggestions coming from the recently cultivated and prolific fields of the natural and the historical sciences, and they were lastly in no small degree revivals or reminiscences of the

has more and more become concentrated. These two problems are not kept sufficiently separate in Schelling's writings. To have separated them is, *inter alia*, one of the merits of Lotze's philosophy; to have attempted the solution one of the claims of two systems, both of which have had an important influence upon Continental thought. I refer to the philosophy of the Unconscious (v. Hartmann in Germany) and the system termed "Personnalisme" (Renouvier in France). Of both these we shall have to take cognisance in the sequel. For the moment the simple statement of the two problems may suffice. The first problem has not necessarily an ethical or religious meaning. It is most clearly defined by Schelling in the well-known Preface which he wrote in the year 1834 to a translation of the lengthy explanation which Victor Cousin prefixed to the 2nd edition of his 'Fragments Philosophiques' (1833). It contains also the distinct enunciation of Schelling's objection to the development which his and Hegel's common position had found in Hegel's own doctrine. He there explains that if the purely Rational, that which we cannot help thinking, is pure subject, then that other

subject which rises through becoming objective to higher subjectivity is no longer the purely rational, but is endowed with an empirical specification. "One who has come later and whom Nature seems to have predestined to give to our age a new Wolffianism, has removed that empirical element, putting in its place the logical notion to which he attributes by a remarkable feat of hypostasis a similarly necessary movement. . . . The logical movement of thought sufficed so long as the system moved within the purely logical; as soon as it has to take the weighty step into reality the thread of dialectical movement breaks; a new hypothesis is necessary so that the idea—we do not know why—may happen to fall asunder into its different moments, so that nature might originate" (Schelling's 'Werke,' vol. x. p. 212). This means, expressed in modern language, that to the necessary must be added the contingent. But, of all that is merely contingent, a matter of accident or of free choice, the most mysterious and inexplicable is the problem of Evil; upon this problem Schelling concentrated his thoughts during the latter half of his lifetime.