

the history of philosophy for the first time when he published his 'Elements of Psycho-Physics.' Although therefore more modern philosophers — such as Wundt and Paulsen—have acknowledged their indebtedness to Fechner's metaphysical views, it can hardly be maintained that before the year 1860 he had any leading influence on the course of philosophical thought; and it is the history of the latter and not of philosophy as such that we are concerned with.

Eduard von Hartmann's position is quite different. He is frequently named together with Lotze and Fechner as being one of the three philosophers who, after Hegel and Schopenhauer, attempted to build philosophical systems on the broad basis of the inductive sciences. Again, we find him classed with Schopenhauer as a prominent representative of Pessimism. And lastly, his system may be characterised as an attempted reconciliation of the intellectualism of Hegel with the voluntarism of Schopenhauer, somewhat on the lines shadowed forth in the later speculations of Schelling. Personally his philosophical career differs from that of Schopenhauer, who remained neglected for a long time. The success of Hartmann's first and typical work¹ was quite phenomenal. It ran through many editions in a comparatively short

analogies led him to the conviction that there is a definite quantitative relation between the mental and the material. By working out this thought more exactly, he became the founder of psycho-physics or experimental psychology." One of the best characteristics of Fechner's personality and speculation will be

found in Prof. Wundt's 'Centenary Address' (1901). It is published in separate form, and contains valuable additions and personal reminiscences.

¹ 'Die Philosophie des Unbewussten' (1st ed., 1869; 11th ed., in 3 vols., 1904).