

period; it may be said that it attracted and satisfied for a time all the popular taste that existed for metaphysics in Germany; but it is only fair to add that it also kept this vanishing interest alive. Hartmann also belongs to that small number of independent and original thinkers who have devoted the whole of their life and strength to the elaboration and defence of their philosophic creed, who have led solitary lives and did not gain reputation either as academic teachers or through the application of their abstract ideas to practical questions.¹ In this respect he resembles Schopenhauer in Germany and Herbert Spencer in England, but differs from Comte in France and from Mill, who were prompted by a lively interest in social, economic, and political questions.

Nevertheless we cannot say that Hartmann made a

¹ The importance of Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) in the history of Thought is twofold. His early celebrity, referred to in the text, was based on the philosophy of the "Unconscious," as Spencer's is, to a large extent, based on the philosophy of the "Unknowable." But in Hartmann's case his earliest work has gradually receded into the background, and a more permanent place in the history of Thought is being gradually won for him through the influence of his later writings. Among these the 'Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins' (1st ed., 1879) and his 'Kategorienlehre' (1896) are of special interest, inasmuch as they contribute, critically and constructively, much that is valuable for the discussion and solution of two problems which occupy a prominent place in philosophical speculation at the present moment. The first of these is the logical or epistemological problem referred to above

(chap. i. p. 72), to arrange in scientific order the original forms of thought through which the human mind ascends from the position of common-sense to the higher regions of speculative thought and spiritual insight—a task begun by Aristotle, taken up again by Kant in modern times, triumphantly solved by Hegel, and since his time more carefully and circumspectly handled in Germany by Lotze, Trendelenburg, Hartmann, and others; in France by Renouvier; in this country by Bradley, Bosanquet, Haldane, and others. The second is the ethical problem, notably the question to what extent a system of morality and rules of conduct can be elaborated independently, or whether a religious or metaphysical foundation is required. In connection with this problem we shall have to deal with Hartmann's position in a later chapter.