

hopelessly without appeal to any unity above them. . . . Such a separation of worth from reality and truth would mutilate our nature, and could end only in irrational compromise or oscillation."

62.
His Monism
or Absolut-
ism.

It may here be remarked that Lotze has been reproved by some critics for countenancing this indecision or oscillation. Mr Bradley, on the other side, is clearly a monist; he believes in one comprehensive Absolute, and he reconciles the existence of this supreme unity with the apparent plurality and the many-sidedness of the phenomenal world by his doctrine of "Degrees of Reality." This is indeed a most important idea, which Mr Bradley has revived in an original manner, and, as it were, introduced into British philosophy. Though very sparing in his quotations and references to earlier thinkers, he distinctly acknowledges his indebtedness to Hegel when he enters on an exposition of this his central conception. Thus he emphasises quite as much that nothing phenomenal, neither external things nor the phenomena and experiences in the regions of art, morals, and religion, are true and comprehensive expressions of the Absolute, as, on the other side, he maintains that they all partake of the truly Real, in some degree; that their reality is not lost but preserved in the truly Real. "Throughout our world, whatever is individual is more real and true, for it contains within its own limits a wider region of the Absolute, and it possesses more intensely the type of self-sufficiency. Or, to put it otherwise, the interval between such an element and the Absolute is smaller. We should require less alteration, less destruction of its own special nature, in order to make this higher element