

tion, all utilitarianism, all eudæmonism or hedonism; morality was solely based upon duty and acted on principle. But Schiller in his essay on 'Grace and Dignity' conceived the union of duty and disposition in the graceful. Whereas Kant gave, in questions of morality, a voice solely to duty, Schiller desired that grace should say to duty, "I will obey you, but you must allow me to love you," but Kant would not allow this. To him it seemed that Schiller had sacrificed the majesty of duty by allying grace with dignity, and by changing morality into beauty, by establishing a friendship between the Rational and the Sensuous: wherever a question of duty presents itself the graces must stand aside. In this way Kant repudiated in the second edition of his tract, the compromise of Schiller.¹

^{22.}
Fichte.

The next thinker of the first order who came under the influence of Kant's ethical doctrine, who felt the necessity of giving it a deeper metaphysical foundation, was Fichte. But Fichte developed also an entirely different element which was contained in Kant's theoretical philosophy. He took up that peculiar method introduced for the first time by Kant into philosophical speculation, the critical or transcendental method. As I have stated on an earlier occasion, Kant had found a new formula for attacking philosophical problems which had been pronounced insoluble by his predecessors such as Hume and others. Assuming that we could not psychologically explain how scientific knowledge originated and was maintained, that we were not able to describe the genesis of knowledge in the human mind,

¹ On all this see *supra*, p. 35.