

events and facts. The *esprit d'ensemble* was to guide the student of social life and progress in arriving at a co-ordination of facts in the same way as it must guide the biologist.¹ In this respect Comte took up the same cue as Schelling had done before him. He was equally impressed by recent researches, which had raised the organic or biological sciences to such a high level, but he took a different view of the principle of this advance. In one respect also Comte resembled Hegel: both were animated by a universalistic tendency; both attempted to grasp the whole of history, not a restricted or limited development in a special period or country. And so it happened to Comte as it did to Hegel, that his followers benefited by the use of the method he had defined, but mostly discarded the first and grand application which he had made of it.

It took, as I stated above, a considerable time

¹ This introduced an apparent dualism into Comte's system and led, in the sequel, to antagonism between two sides in the positive school not unlike the split which took place among Hegel's followers. This is clearly brought out in an important work by Dr Paul Barth which bears the title 'Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie' (1897): "In the sketch which we owe to Comte a closer scrutiny reveals a contradiction: the social series is a continuation of the animal but it is impossible to deduce it therefrom. From the properties of individuals—Comte frequently insists—the evolution of society cannot be deduced; sociology cannot be got out of physiology however much biology may form the foundation. The latter gives only certain general

conceptions, of development, of specialisation of organs, of consensus or solidarity. The positive law of development is that of the three states, by no means a biological but a logical principle. Thus Comte's by no means a monist, for, with him, these two principles at least confront each other. It is therefore quite natural that among the students of sociology that follow, a division should take place. As the intellectual principle strongly predominates with Comte, so much so that it is by no means surprising that it led, in his subjective period, to a fantastic spiritualism, his disciples saw their task in an elaboration of the same. On the other side the natural sciences made, after Comte, great progress, so that it appeared enticing to cultivate the biological side of the system" (vol. i. p. 58).