VII.

Looking broadly at the whole development of philosophical thought, especially in Germany, we are struck by the absence of clear definitions of the many words and phrases in which the various doctrines are presented to us. To take only two examples: the word "mind" is used in many different senses, sometimes denoting the "individual mind," sometimes the "general or universal mind"; it is sometimes opposed to "body," sometimes to "nature or matter"; the adjectives denoting it signifying sometimes "mental" and sometimes "spiritual."

Again the word "self," which in post-Kantian philosophy appeared as the I or ego, stands sometimes for that inner region of our being which is known only to each individual; sometimes it must mean the external appearance of our being as one among many not-selves, and these not-selves may be either things or other selves. A still greater ambiguity prevails in the use of terms such as "Reason," "Understanding," "Sensations," and "Thought." These terms sometimes appear as representing different parts of the mental life, sometimes as generic names for mental processes.

Compared with these complicated structures, built up by German thinkers, the philosophy of this country appears extremely simple, and was regarded by some of the Transcendentalists abroad as childish and trivial. The complicated structures of German