

aroused and mingled with the purely objective appearances which they accompany.

It would lead us too far, and is not necessary for our present purpose, to describe in detail the characteristic differences between those sensations which we externalise, attributing to them a double existence, and those others which remain to us always purely personal or subjective. But it is important to remind the reader that in the stream of thought or in the firmament of consciousness, they occupy just as real a place as do those sensations and thoughts which we believe also to exist elsewhere outside of our individual consciousness.

What interests us at present is the question, To what extent we are justified in attributing to them, or to some of them, Reality?

To begin with, we are struck by the fleeting and undefined character of what we may now call our inner sensations or feelings. We have difficulty in fixing them, and even if we succeed in doing so, they are nevertheless mostly of a changing nature; and if they recur, they rarely do so exactly the same. But this would not be a sufficient reason to deny them Reality in the sense in which we use the word; for many sensations which we term external are likewise fleeting, difficult to fix, and never recur exactly the same. Thus clouds are proverbially fleeting, changing, and never come back again in the same way; nevertheless we do not deny them the attribute of Reality, and we may even call them things. One of the principal differences between physical and emotional sensations is this: we may feel sure that the former exist also