

on the same moving plane of our inward field of vision.

Thus the doctrine of the "Association of Ideas" must be revised and re-written from a wider point of view. Reverting now to the phenomenon of imitation, we may say that imitation is probably unconscious on its first appearance, but it soon becomes conscious and is associated with the intellectual interest which the child's mind increasingly takes in in the happenings which surround it. And connected with this interest, which marks a selecting process, is the feeling of effort accompanying such movements as are of special interest.

The feeling of interest is probably the first sign of what, in the developing consciousness, presents itself as value: interested movements or interesting things acquire in the acting and observing consciousness a new property which, though entirely subjective, soon becomes projected outside as an attribute of things and events in the objective world.

But it is well to remark here that the attributes of interest and value never attain that objective reality which attaches to definite sensations or clusters of sensations.

The attribute of interest or of value hovers, as it were, between the object and the perceiving or acting subject. We are not able to share the feeling of interest or appreciation so completely with other persons as we share, or think we share, certain definite sensations. These feelings of interest and value change also very markedly in our own experience. Things we admire, or occupations we delight in, very