

It remains, therefore, only to bring to a close what has been said by a few remarks which may furnish a short summary of the results we have arrived at. We started with the position in which Hume had left the study of the human mind or human nature, and adopted a line of thought which professes to be not a refutation of Hume's position but a further development of the course of inquiry initiated by Descartes and Locke, and carried forward by Berkeley and Hume himself. With him a certain point was reached where his inevitable scepticism led to an attitude which proved both in theory and in practice to require refutation or correction.

It does not seem to have occurred to any one to push Hume's method—which was nothing but the plain historical method of his forerunners—further on, and apply it to other ideas, tracing their genesis in the human mind in the same way as they did with the two fundamental notions of Substance and Causality.

But this is exactly what we have attempted—tentatively and imperfectly—in the foregoing chapters.

With this intention we dwelt notably on two points where we seemed to discover the possibility for this further development. There may be other fruitful ways of overcoming Hume's scepticism without departing from the main course of British philosophy, but we have limited ourselves mainly to two, the discussion of which does not seem to involve that break of continuity of thought which is usually considered to mark subsequent philosophy both in this country and abroad.