

II.

The first remark which we had to make about Hume's treatment was this: that Hume dealt with single perceptions or ideas and not with their actual connection as presented in our experience. It seemed necessary for us to note the recurrent connections and groups in which sensations or perceptions appeared in the primordial experience of the mind. These recurrent clusters or complexes of sensations stand out clearly on the background of the changing firmament of consciousness. Among these we noted as probably the earliest appearance of this kind the figure of a person or persons, and further on of lifeless things.

The infant's mind becomes in this way familiar with a detached world consisting of separate things which stand out and force themselves on attention and memory. This experience leads, in the further course of our early life, to fixed clusters or arrangements of sensations and perceptions possessing both totality and individuality. The mind learns to look at things as coherent groups forming an *ensemble* or "Together," each with its own individuality or separateness.

There still remains the background of our total experience at any moment, and this we learn to distinguish by the term Self, in contrast to the definite things which, as it were, stand out both within and against it.

In the second place, we noted that though this process would lead to the notion of the contrast of Object and Subject, it would not be sufficient to generate the idea of reality and unreality; both the things