

the physics of the mind, should be kept distinct from logic and ethics, and the philosophy of taste. The question, 'What is beautiful in scenery?' or 'What is right in character?' or 'What is just in argument?' is distinct from the question, 'What is the actual and historical procedure of the mind in addressing itself to these respective objects of contemplation?' as distinct, indeed, as the question of '*Quid est,*' is from '*Quid oportet ;*' or as the question of 'What is,' from 'What ought to be.'* A sound objective system of ethics may be framed, irrespective of any attention that we give to man's moral constitution. A sound system of logic may be framed, irrespective of any attention that we give to man's intellectual constitution. And on the other hand, however obscure or unsettled these sciences may still be, and more especially, whatever controversies may yet obtain respecting the nature and the elementary principles of virtue,—such, notwithstanding, may be the palpable and ascertained facts in the nature and history of subjective man, that, both on his mental constitution, and on the adaptation thereto of ex-

* See the Introduction to Sir James Macintosh's Ethical Dissertation. "The purpose of the physical sciences, throughout all their provinces, is to answer the question, '*What is?*' The purpose of the moral sciences is to answer the question, '*What ought to be?*'"—It should be well kept in view, that mental philosophy is one province of the physical sciences, and belongs to the first of these two departments, being distinct from moral philosophy, which forms the second of them.