

servation peculiarly applicable, in announcing that great fact or phenomenon of mind, which, for many reasons, should hold a foremost place in our demonstration — we mean the felt supremacy of conscience. Philosophers there are, who have attempted to resolve this fact into ulterior or ultimate ones in the mental constitution ; and who have denied to the faculty a place among its original and uncompounded principles. Sir James Macintosh tells us of the generation of human conscience ; and, not merely states, but endeavours to explain the phenomenon of its felt supremacy within us. Dr. Adam Smith also assigns a pedigree to our moral judgments ; but, with all his peculiar notions respecting the origin of the awards of conscience, he never once disputes their authority ; or that, by the general consent of mankind, this authority is, in sentiment and opinion at least, conceded to them.* It is somewhat like an

* “Upon whatever,” observes Dr. Adam Smith, “we suppose our moral faculties to be founded, whether upon a certain modification of reason, upon an original instinct called a moral sense, or upon some other principle of our nature, it cannot be doubted that they were given us for the direction of our conduct in this life. They carry along with them the most evident badges of this authority, which denote that they were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions, to superintend all our senses, passions, and appetites, and to judge how far each of them was either to be indulged or restrained. It is the peculiar office of these faculties to judge, to bestow censure or applause upon all the other principles of our nature.”—*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Part iii, chap. v.