

CHAPTER II.

SECOND GENERAL ARGUMENT.

*On the inherent Pleasure of the Virtuous, and
Misery of Vicious Affections.*

1. WE are often told by moralists, that there is a native and essential happiness in moral worth; and a like native and essential wretchedness in moral depravity—inso-much that the one may be regarded as its own reward, and the other as its own punishment. We do not always recollect that this happiness on the one hand, and this misery on the other, are each of them made up, severally of distinct ingredients; and that thus, by mental analysis, we might strengthen our argument both for the being and the character of God. When we discover, that, into this alleged happiness of the good there enter more enjoyments than one, we thereby obtain two or more testimonies of the Divine regard for virtue; and the proof is enhanced, in the same peculiar way that the evidence of design is, in any other department of creation, when we perceive the concurrence of so many separate and independent elements, which meet together